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This paper explores several paths by which the extended cognition (EC) thesis may overcome the
coupling-constitution fallacy. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings in the contemporary
literature. First, on the dimension of first-wave EC, I argue that constitutive arguments based on functional
parity suffer from either a threat of cognitive bloat or an impasse with respect to determining the correct
level of grain in the attribution of causal-functional roles. Second, on the dimension of second-wave EC, I
argue that especially the complementarity approach suffers from a similar sort of dilemma as first-wave
EC: an inability to justify just what entails the ontological claim of EC over the scaffolding claim of weaker
approaches in cognitive science. In this paper I show that two much more promising explanations by
which to ground the ontological claim of EC are available, both starting from an exploration of the
coordination dynamics between environmental resources and neural resources. On the one hand, I argue
that second-wave EC based on cognitive integration, with its focus on bodily manipulations constrained
by cognitive norms, is capable of resolving the coupling-constitution fallacy. On the other hand, I argue
that the framework of cognitive integration can be supplemented by philosophical accounts of
mechanistic explanation, because such accounts enable us to explain the emergence of higher-level
cognitive properties due to a system's organization-dependent structure.
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1. Introduction

In contemporary philosophy of mind the extended cognition (EC) thesis holds that there are conditions
under which cognitive processes and cognitive systems are spatiotemporally spread across brain, body
and world in such a way that extra-neuronal elements in close interplay with neuronal elements
constitute some cognitive process or cognitive system (Clark 2008; Menary 2007, 2010; 2010abc;
Rowlands 2010; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2010; Wilson 2010). Despite the availability of weaker theses of
embedded, situated, or scaffolded cognition (Robbins & Aydede 2009; Rupert 2009; Sterelny 2010),
proponents of EC argue that extra-neural resources do more than aid, sculpt, or augment cognition:
extra-neural resources are often constitutive elements of cognitive processing or cognitive systems. As
Wilson notes: “Thus, if the extended mind thesis is true, it is true in virtue of something
implementationally deep about cognition.” (2010, p. 171) Or, as Wheeler argues: “[…] the key issue
facing [extended] theorists right now is not how to argue against the received (if that’s what it still is)
orthodox view in cognitive science, but rather how to justify the transition from a “merely” embodiedembedded mind to an extended one.” (2010, p. 247)
My aim in this paper is to argue that the philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation, with a
focus on compositional relations, provide a fertile framework for (a) exploring the ontological basis of
EC-style explanations, and (b) dissolving the “coupling-constitution fallacy” (Adams & Aizawa 2001,
2008) objection leveled against EC.

1.1. Scope of the argument and strategy

In the EC literature, “first-wave EC” (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Wheeler 2010) is the
classical version of EC based on functionalist considerations. The constitution claim of first-wave EC
is commonly expressed in terms of partial constitution, where a cognitive process or cognitive system
is partly constituted by environmental resources playing functionally isomorphic roles in guiding
behavior as those realized by neural resources. With regards to first-wave EC, I aim to show that
attempting to base the constitution claim by way of functional isomorphism between the “internal” and
the “external” is problematic and therefore unlikely to work as intended (Rowlands 2010; Sprevak
2009). Before looking at “second-wave EC” (Menary 2007, 2010abc; Sutton 2010), I explore other
options available to the EC theorist in order to make a case for the constitution claim. That is, the EC
theorist could look to metaphysical relations as supervenience, material constitution, composition, or
realization. I shall argue that the relata of material constitution and supervenience are problematic due
to discrepancies between the properties of supervenience and material constitution and the properties of
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extended cognitive systems. In contrast to these two building-relations, the view I shall defend is that
such a lack of fit does not exist between the properties of composition and realization and the
properties of extended cognitive systems and processes. These latter relations of determination provide
a more solid ground from which to re-evaluate EC-style constitution claims.
In addition to first-wave EC, “second-wave EC” pursues the constitution claim from both
complementarity arguments (Sutton 2010) and integrationist arguments (Menary 2007, 2010abc). Even
though it shows signs of immunity against the problems hindering first-wave EC, I shall argue that the
complementarity view alone is insufficient to substantiate the constitution claim of EC. This is not due
to flaws with the complementarity view itself, but rather results from its openness to a stalemate
situation into which the debate over causal and constitutive dependence relations has fallen. Hence, it
follows that for complementarity

to suffice, it requires supplementation.

Menary’s cognitive

integrationist framework offers a better starting point from which to begin to solve the couplingconstitution fallacy. As a case in point, the cognitive integrationist does not begin from the premise that
environmental resources become cognitive simply by being coupled to an already existing cognitive
agent (Menary 2006, p. 335). Instead Menary aims to explain how the coordination dynamics of
heterogeneously “internal” and “external” components assemble extended cognitive processes and
cognitive systems. I follow Menary (see also Hurley 2010) in arguing that EC should focus less on
explaining the metaphysics of EC and focus instead on explaining the empirical issue of “[…] why X
and Y are so coordinated that they together function as Z […].” (2006, p. 334)
The strategy of this paper is to argue that it is possible to supplement the cognitive integrationist
framework by explaining the kinds of coordination dynamics that Menary has in mind by making use
of the philosophical framework of mechanistic explanation and mechanistic composition. Doing so, I
submit, generates two different but complementary theoretical models by which to approach the strong
ontological claim of EC-style explanations. What is the relationship between these two approaches? On
the one hand, the framework of cognitive integration establishes the constitution claim by explaining
integration on a dimension of bodily manipulations constrained by socio-cultural cognitive norms,
whereas mechanistic explanation targets the emergence of cognitive properties on the systemic
dimension of mechanistic organization. On the other hand, both approaches focus on providing subpersonal and mechanistic descriptions of cognitive processes and the formation of cognitive systems.

2. Coupling-constitution fallacy:

I begin by exposing the coupling-constitution fallacy (C-C fallacy). According to several critics of the
thesis of EC (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010; 2010a; Rupert 2004; 2009), the most common
and pervasive mistake EC-theorists make (Adams & Aizawa 2010, p. 68) is to tacitly move “from the
observation that a process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to
the conclusion that X is part of the cognitive process Y.” (Adams & Aizawa 2009, p. 81) Note that in
this passage the C-C fallacy concerns cognitive processes. However, the fallacy is not limited to
processes. In the following passage, Adams & Aizawa criticize Clark for making the fallacy on the
level of cognitive processes and also the level of entire cognitive systems:
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“When Clark makes an object cognitive when it is connected to a cognitive agent, he is committing an
instance of a ‘‘coupling-constitution fallacy.’’ This is the most common mistake that extended mind
theorists make. The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which some object
or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, one slides to the conclusion that
the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing. If you are
coupled to your pocket notebook in the sense of always having it readily available, use it a lot, trust it
implicitly, and so forth, then Clark infers that the pocket notebook constitutes a part of your memory
store.” (2010, pp. 67-68)

It follows, according to the critics, that one is committing an instance of the C-C fallacy when one
conflates observations about an individual cognitive agent’s causal interactions with extra-neural
resources or observations about dynamical coupling relations between an individual cognitive agent
and parts of the extra-neural world, with those extra-neural elements being constitutive parts of an
individual’s cognitive process or cognitive system. Before looking at the different constitution
arguments in first- and second-wave EC, it is important to be clear about what role the appeal to causal
interaction or causal coupling is intended to play in the argument for EC. Both Clark (2008, p. 87) and
Menary (2010c, p. 608) are particularly clear about this. As Clark says, the “appeal to coupling is not
intended to make any external object cognitive […]. Rather, it is intended to make some object, which
in and of itself is not usefully […] thought of as either cognitive or noncognitive, into a proper part of
some cognitive routine.” (2008, p. 87; italics in original) So it immediately appears as if the EC theorist
can counter at least one aspect of the C-C fallacy, namely the charge that EC is guilty of making an
object cognitive just by the object being coupled to a cognitive agent. However, the EC theorist has yet
to counter Adams & Aizawa’s claim that any inference from coupling to the conclusion that “external”
elements are constitutive parts of an extended cognitive system or cognitive process is an instance of
the C-C fallacy. It is to these arguments that I now turn.

3. First-wave EC & extended functionalism

First-wave EC aims at grounding the constitution claim on functionalist considerations. In “In Defense
of Extended Functionalism” (2010), Wheeler provides the following argument concerning whether
“external” elements qualify as proper parts of an extended cognitive process or system:

1.

“If psychological phenomena are constituted by their causal-functional role, then our terms for
mental states, mental processes, and so on pick out equivalence classes of different material
substrates, any one of which might in principle realize the type-identified states or process in
question.” (Wheeler 2010, p. 248; compare Clark 2005, p. 2)

2.

“If there is functional equality with respect to governing behavior, between the causal contribution
of certain internal elements and the causal contribution of certain external elements, and if the
internal elements concerned qualify as the proper parts of a cognitive trait, then there is no good
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reason to deny equivalent status - that is, cognitive status - to the relevant external elements.”
(Wheeler 2010, p. 248; compare Clark 2008, p. 50)
3.

If parity of causal contribution mandates parity of status, and if mental states and processes are
multiply realizable, then “it is possible for the very same type-identified cognitive state or process
to be available in two different generic formats - one non-extended and one extended.” (Wheeler
2010, p. 248)

4.

Therefore: Cognitive processes and states are realizable (partly at least) by external states and
processes (Wheeler 2010, p. 249; compare Clark 2008, p. 39).

The logical form of this argument follows from the functionalist parity principle (PP) originally
introduced by Clark & Chalmers (1998):

“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head,
we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is
[…] part of the cognitive process.” (1998, p. 2)

To make sense of Wheeler’s argument and the PP, I shall revisit Clark & Chalmers’ original case of
Otto & Inga (1998, pp. 12-14). In a similar vein as Wheeler, Clark & Chalmers invite us to consider the
idea that a cognitive process, namely a standing belief about the location of the Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA) in New York, could be instantiated in two different generic formats. In the example, Otto &
Inga hear about an art exhibition at MoMA. After hearing the news about the exhibition, Inga thinks
about the location of MoMA, remembers that it is on 53rd St., and sets off. Otto, on the other hand,
suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s and is therefore unable to reliably use his biological memory
to recall the address. Fortunately for Otto, he always – as a compensatory strategy – writes down useful
information in a notebook. Just like Inga, Otto hears about the exhibition, but quite unlike Inga, Otto
consults his notebook, retrieves the address, and sets off. Moving from the philosophical theory of
functionalism, which holds that psychological states like beliefs are constituted not by way of their
material makeup but rather in terms of their causal-functional role in generating appropriate behavior,
the result that the proponents of first-wave EC want us to accept is that type-identified mental states are
available in both a non-extended and an extended format.

3.1. Problems with first-wave EC & extended functionalism

Unlike the standard anti-EC arguments (Rupert 2004), where it is commonly argued that the
constitution claim of EC fails because of the obvious distinctiveness between the fine-grained profile of
“internal,” neural operations and the profiles of “external,” sociocultural operations, the particular kind
of arguments that I shall explore in this section do not revolve around this kind of skepticism. I agree
with Menary (2010, p. 5) and Wheeler (2010, p. 248) that it is incorrect to interpret the PP as entailing
any fine-grained functional similarity between the properties of “internal” and “external” mechanisms
and their operations. Instead a satisfactory response to the kind of objections that I shall deal with
begins by acknowledging that functionalism was engineered, in part, so as to avoid chauvinistic
exclusion of cognition or mentality from individuals (or organisms) with differences in fine-grained
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causal-functional profile or in fine-grained physiological makeup (Block 1980).

3.1.1. Sprevak’s Martian intuition

Sprevak (2009) presents first-wave EC with an intriguing dilemma: (a) accept functionalism and
radical EC; or, (b) give up EC entirely (2009, p. 503). The point that Sprevak wishes to make is that if
one accepts functionalism, then one is committed to a radical and implausible version of EC, where the
price of taking EC on board is “rampant expansion of the mind into the world […].” (2009, p. 503)
Here is the form of Sprevak’s argument:

1.

Functionalism entails the Martian intuition (P).

2.

If P, then radical EC (Q).

3.

P.

4.

Therefore, Q.

So, if functionalism entails the Martian intuition and if EC builds its constitutive claim on
functionalism, then first-wave EC is committed to a radically implausible version of EC where the
following scenario holds: simply by picking up a book, one comes to believe all the information
contained in that book. In other words, everything stored in that token book is necessarily a part of my
cognition (or mind). Following Sprevak’s argument, the justification for this (wild) claim is as follows:
(a) a Martian might “internally” encode memories in ink-marks; (b) in addition to gaining its beliefs via
sense modalities, such a Martian might equally be born with innate beliefs; (c) moreover, it is possible
that the Martian might have such innate beliefs that it has not yet examined, viz., that the Martian has a
library of data phylogenetically hardwired into its cognitive system; and (d) finally it is possible to
imagine that this Martian has such a stock of innate beliefs stored in an ink-based memory system,
most of which it has not yet had any reason (or cause) to employ. Sprevak’s point is that it quite
plausible to think that such a creature could exist. As Sprevak says, the:

“Martian has ink-marks inside its head that, if it were sufficiently diligent, would guide its action in
appropriate ways. The difference between the Martian and me is that it has the ink-marks inside its head,
while I have the ink-marks outside. By the fair-treatment principle, if the Martian has beliefs, then so do I.”
(2009, p. 518)

If Sprevak is correct, basing the constitution claim on the PP would seem to license an overly
permissive and implausible attribution of cognitive processes or states. Hence, it is not clear that the PP
can be used as a principle of demarcation between what is and what is not a proper part of an extended
cognitive system or process. One might attempt to augment the PP by reference to the so-called “glueand-trust conditions” (Clark & Chalmers 1998). The glue-and-trust conditions state that external
resources might count as part of cognition only if such resources are (a) reliably available and typically
invoked, (b) more-or-less automatically endorsed, and (c) that the information carried in the resource
be easily accessible when required (1998, p. 17). According to Sprevak, these conditions will not save
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first-wave EC, since it is not necessary for an environmental resource to be part of a cognitive system
or process that such a resource fulfill (a)-(c). Here I restrict myself to condition (a). On Sprevak’s view,
it is possible to imagine a Martian, whose cognitive resources are only available after a good night’s
sleep, and that this Martian does not reliably or often get a good night’s sleep. However, “that does not
stop, on those occasions when the Martian does get a good night’s sleep, those resources from counting
as genuinely cognitive.” (Sprevak 2009, pp. 515-16) So it would seem that the glue-and-trust
conditions would not save first-wave EC from the negative ramifications entailed by the Martian
intuition.
3.1.2. Rowland’s impasse

But should we just accept Sprevak’s argument? One response that is available to first-wave EC is to go
between the horns of the dilemma, by arguing that the relevant level of grain by which we “individuate
functional roles should be set neither too high (so as not to entail radical EC) nor too low (so as to
block the critics’ difference-argument).”

(Anonymous referee) Wheeler (2010) takes up this line of

response. Note that this is not the only way the EC theorist could attempt to deflate Sprevak’s
argument. Second-wave EC seems immune to the Martian intuition. For instance, on Menary’s version
of cognitive integration, it is not functional similarity that matters, but rather how the coordination
between functionally dissimilar “inner” and “outer” elements are integrated to establish deeply hybrid
minds (Menary 2006, p. 333). As Theiner has recently said about second-wave EC, it is one “which is
completely devoid of this questionable presupposition [functional similarity between “inner” and
“outer], and thus affords a logically independent path to the claim that cognition is extended.” (2011, p.
52) However, the question that shall entertain us here is whether Wheeler’s case holds water?
Rowlands has argued that establishing the relevant level of granularity with respect to functional
roles – between those who accept EC and those who do not – leads to an impasse, the ramifications
having a paralyzing affect on the entire debate over cognitive distribution:

“If Rupert’s arguments against the extended mind are question-begging because they presuppose a
chauvinistic form of functionalism, it is difficult to see why arguments for the extended mind are not
question-begging given their predication on a liberal form of functionalism.” (Rowlands, unpublished ms,
pp. 6-7; quoted from Wheeler 2010, p. 255; see also Rowlands 2010, pp. 209-10)

In what we might call Rupert-style anti-EC (2004, 2009; see also Adam & Aizawa 2001, 2008), the
most common way of criticizing extended functionalism consists in noting a set of psychological
properties found in human cognitive systems but not socio-cultural systems, and then inferring that
there is no parity at the level of fine-grained functional operations between “inner” and “outer”. Hence,
EC must be false. The proponents of first-wave EC commonly respond to this line of argument by
charging Rupert-style anti-EC of advocating a chauvinistic form of functionalism; one that privileges
the neuronal innards solely on their fine-grained psychological profile. As Wheeler says, “it seems that
Rupert’s […] argument continues to beg the question against extended functionalism. […], extended
functionalism looks to be predicated on the more liberal form of functionalism that generates a
locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive.” (2010, p. 255) It is from the problem of identifying
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the appropriate level of functional grain that Rowlands concludes that the debate over EC has fallen
into an impasse, with both sides potentially begging the question against one another

3.1.3. Theiner’s rule of extended fairness

The trouble confronting Wheeler’s reply to the Martian intuition is not only limited to the debate over
extended functionalism. As Rowlands points out (2010, p. 210), the problem of identifying the correct
level of grain is an old problem for functionalist theories of mind, the solution being far from readily
available. One could argue, with the aim of saving Wheeler’s strategy, that just because a
“compromise-solution” on how to set the benchmarks for functional grain have plagued philosophical
functionalism in the past (and still does), this does not present a lethal problem for extended
functionalism. Theiner endorses such a position. In his (2011), Theiner introduces what he calls the rule
of “extended fairness”: “Don’t burden the theory of the extended mind with problems that equally
affect theories of the non-extended mind.” (2011, p. 34) According to Theiner, both Sprevak (2009) and
Rowlands (unpublished ms) disregard this rule precisely because they are pointing to flaws that not
only affect EC but equally non-extended versions of functionalism. I agree with Theiner on this issue:
the fact that this problem poses “an equal challenge for internalist and extended versions of
functionalism shows that the problem cannot be specific to the HEC (rather than functionalism
simpliciter).” (2011, p. 35; italic in original) However, this response is not completely satisfying
because the proponent of Rupert-style anti-EC can force the issue, “and demand a further reason for
why we should consider the external resources as part of a single, transcranially extended cognitive
process.” (Theiner 2011, p. 56) Hence, even if “it would be premature to declare that the debate over
extended functionalism suffers from a lethal kind of indeterminacy […],” (Theiner 2011, p. 49) it
leaves the debate between Rupert-style anti-EC and EC unresolved.

4. Causation, material constitution, supervenience, composition and realization!

The point of the preceding section has been to present evidence suggesting that basing the strong
ontological claim of EC by appealing to the functionalist PP of first-wave EC is problematic. In this
section, I consider a variety of other options available to the EC theorist in making a case for the
constitution claim. I begin by giving a brief sketch of the causation relation. This is done to
accommodate Menary’s claim that an “account of the difference between causation and constitution
would be helpful here, but there is none forthcoming […].” (2010, p. 607)

4.1. Causation
!
Causation is a temporal and asymmetric relation between cause and effect: if y is caused by x at t, then
x do not spatiotemporally overlap with y. In a slogan: causes precede their effects (Craver & Bechtel
2007, p. 552; Shapiro 2010, pp. 159-61). As such, a causal relation between y and x is such that the
space-time path of y is distinct from the space-time path of x. For instance, to make sense of why the
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constitution relation does not entail a relation of causation, Rowlands introduces the following example
(originally due to Davidson 1987):

“Dependence, even essential dependence, does not add up to constitution – not without a lot of
argument. Sunburn is (essentially) dependent on solar radiation in the sense that any skin
discoloration not produced by solar radiation is not sunburn. But this does not mean that solar
radiation is literally part of – a component of – sunburn.” (2010, p. 56; italics in original)

It follows that solar radiation causes sunburn but does not constitute sunburn. At no point in time does
solar radiation either spatially coincide or materially overlap with sunburn. As Rowlands intends us to
understand the sunburn-example, sunburn is individuation-dependent on its causal etiology, since being
overexposed to incident UV-radiation can cause sunburn. But it does not follow that solar radiation is
literally part of the sunburnt skin. Contrast this initially with material constitution: if x takes place prior
to y, or if x takes place apart from y, or if x and y reciprocally influence each other, then x causes, but
does not constitute, y (Shapiro 2010).

4.2. Material Constitution

Material constitution is a non-causal and synchronic (atemporal) relation of ontological determination
between spatially and materially co-located objects, processes or properties of different or similar kind
(Bennett 2011). The constitution relation can be framed in terms of how to fill out the following
schema: x constitutes y at t if and only if

? (Wasserman 2004, p. 694). In analytical metaphysics,

the philosophical home of constitution debates, there is some dispute about how to adequately fill out
this schema. However, it is widely accepted that x constitutes y if and only if the constitution relation
upholds the following coincidence and formal conditions. There are two coincidence conditions. First,
constitution requires spatial coincidence: x constitutes y at t only if x and y have the same spatial
location at t. Second, constitution requires material coincidence: x constitutes y at t only if x and y
share all the same parts at t (Wasserman 2004, p. 694; Wilson 2007, p. 5). In conjunction with these
conditions of coincidence, it is widely accepted that the relation of constitution respects the following
three formal conditions. First, the constitution relation is transitive: if x constitutes y, and if x (or the xs)
is (are) constituted by z (or the zs), then y is constituted by z (or the zs). Second, the constitution
relation is irreflexive: x constitutes y and neither y nor x constitute themselves. Finally, the constitution
relation is asymmetric: x constitutes y, y does not constitute x (or the xs). According to Wasserman
(2004, p. 695; see also Baker 2000; Lowe 1989), these conditions are minimal requirements offered by
constitution theorists.
We are now able to highlight a few important features distinguishing causation from material
constitution. First, both material constitution and causation are asymmetric relations of dependence.
However, unlike the asymmetry of causation, the property of asymmetry on material constitution
relations is a “one-to-one” relation of determination. That is to say, when y is caused by x and time t1, x
necessarily precedes y on a temporal dimension. So on a causal relation, the cause (x) and the effect (y)
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do not spatiotemporally overlap. This is different on the relation of material constitution, since here the
asymmetry is to be understood as follows: if a piece of clay constitutes a token statue, the piece of clay
and the statue overlap in a spatiotemporal sense. This is why relations of material constitution – and not
causal relations – are one-to-one relations of determination. Second, the synchronic (or atemporal)
nature of material constitution sets it apart from causation, for while cause and effect are independent
events in time, the relation between constituent(s) and constituted is simultaneous.
There are several problems with this relation of determination at least insofar as it is employed in
helping EC justify its constitution claim. The first problem is ontological in the sense that material
constitution requires material coincidence between parts and whole: x constitutes y at t only if x and y
share all the same parts at t. However, this condition does not fit with the nature of an extended
cognitive system. One objection to this claim is to argue that the structured collection “of the relevant
parts of” brain, body, and world which are presumed to materially constitute an extended cognitive
system at time t have all the same parts of the extended cognitive system at time t – viz., the extended
cognitive system exists at time t wherever its physically constitutive parts are at time t. I am
sympathetic to this claim, since it is indeed the case that an extended cognitive system at time t is
wherever its component parts are at time t. Moreover, it likely does not follow that all (mereological)
parts, P, of the physical objects partly constituting, at time t, an extended cognitive system S, are
equally parts of S. The point that I wish to highlight, though, is different: the material coincidence
condition does not mesh with the hybrid character of extended cognitive systems, since even if y shares
all the parts of the xs, this does not hold at the level of the constituents. The xs do not share the same
parts. In addition to this, the xs are temporally and spatially distributed from one another. Hence, unlike
the relation of clay and statue, the dynamics and characteristics between the larger extended cognitive
system and its parts do not correspond with material constitution. The second problem is formal.
Material constitution is a non-causal, asymmetrical relation of ontological determination. But, the
empirical fundament of EC is inherently causal and symmetrical, in the sense that the empirical basis
of an extended cognitive system is formulated in terms of a dynamically coupled, co-determining
relation between agent and ecological niche (Beer 2000; Clark 1997; Van Gelder 1995).

4.3. Supervenience

I include supervenience here because proponents of EC refer to this kind of relation in order to ground
the constitution claim. For instance, Wilson & Clark claim: “we should treat the nonbiological
augmentation as part of the material supervenience base for some of Otto’s long-term, nonoccurrent,
dispositional beliefs […].” (2009, p. 66) Supervenience, just as material constitution, is a non-causal
and atemporal relation between, e.g., mental properties and properties of physical processes. But unlike
material constitution, there is a general consensus that the supervenience relation does not guarantee a
relation of ontological dependence (McLaughlin & Bennett 2005). As such, a supervenience relation
does not necessarily guarantee a relation of constitution. This fact in itself makes the appeal to
supervenience problematic as an attempt to underpin the constitution claim of EC. In all fairness,
Wilson & Clark mention other forms of ontological dependence relations – in particular, Wilson’s
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(2001, 2004, 2005) theory of “wide-realization.” I discuss this in the next section. Here I shall keep
focusing on the relation of supervenience. According to McLaughlin & Bennett (2005), all a relation of
supervenience establishes prima facie is a relation of covariance between, e.g., mental properties and
physical properties. Moreover, unlike material constitution, supervenience is reflexive. There can be no
variation on mental properties (M) unless there is variation in physical properties (P), and vice versa,
given that M = P. Finally, in contrast to material constitution, the supervenience relation is nonsymmetric, i.e., the supervenience relation alters between symmetric and asymmetric instantiations
(McLaughlin & Bennett 2005).
!4.4. Composition

Composition is a non-causal and synchronic relation of ontological dependence and it holds between
heterogeneous elements, e.g., between a mechanism and its complementing parts (Craver & Bechtel
2007, p. 547). Again we can frame the composition relation in terms of how to fill out the following
schema: x (or the xs) compose(s) y at t if and only if

? (Hawley 2006, p. 483). Unlike material

constitution, where something is a material constitution relation if and only if it upholds certain
coincidence condition, compositional relations are less demanding in that they require only coexistence
conditions. First, composition requires only spatial coexistence: the xs compose y at t only if y as a
whole share the same space-time path as the xs and no two of the xs occupy an overlapping space-time
path (Hawley 2006, p. 483). In the case of extended cognitive systems, the system as a whole coexists
spatially with the mereological sum of the parts, and none of the parts occupy overlapping regions of
space. On a first pass, then, an extended cognitive system exhibits the property of spatial coexistence.
Second, composition requires material coexistence: the xs compose y at t only if y as a whole is
composed of the material parts of the xs and no two of the xs materially overlap in terms of their parts.
This fits the nature of an extended cognitive system, in the sense that EC theorists often conceive of
such systems as collectively composed of disparate parts, none of which materially overlap. Hence, the
component parts of an extended cognitive system occupy non-identical spatial locations within one
distributed cognitive system.
To make it clear which kind of compositional relation I have in mind here, I shall adopt Craver’s
(2007) taxonomy distinguishing between four different notions of composition: mereological,
aggregative, spatial/material, and mechanistic composition. The notion of composition I shall support,
and the one lending support to an explanation of the emergence of higher-level cognitive properties is
mechanistic composition (Theiner 2009). First, consider the “extensionality theorem” inherent to the
mereological relation of composition: “an object is completely determined by the set of its parts.”
(Craver 2007, p. 185) In contrast to mechanistic composition, where emphasis is on explaining
emergent higher-level phenomena by reference to the organization-dependence of the enabling system,
the extensionality theorem implies the structural organization of the systemic components does not
matter as an ontological principle. Second, on the aggregativity relation of composition, “the relata are
properties of wholes and the properties of parts, and the relation between them is that higher-level
properties are sums of lower-level properties.” (Craver 2007, p. 186) However following Wimsatt
(1974, 1986), Theiner (2009, 2011) has recently argued that the emergence of complex properties in
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extended cognitive systems is a result of that system failing to exhibit aggregativity in its structural
composition (Theiner & O’Connor 2010, p. 84). Hence, aggregate systems lack the required integration
between its component parts to be explanatorily useful in addressing EC’s constitution claim. Third, the
relation of material and spatial composition equally fails to capture the nature of extended cognitive
systems. For instance, as Craver notes, “thinking of levels in this way does not allow one to distinguish
between mere pieces and its components.” (2007, p. 187; italics in original) Decomposing a system into
mere spatial and material pieces does not (and will be highly unlikely to) guarantee decomposition into
the systemic components, i.e., elements “that make identifiable contributions to the behavior of a
mechanism.” (Craver 2007, p. 188) Fourth, Craver defines the relation of mechanistic composition as
follows: “X’s Φ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s Ψ-ing. Lower-level components are
organized together to form higher-level components.” (2007, p. 189) Consider, for instance, the
compositional layout of a synapse. A synapse is composed of part of a pre-synaptic cell, part of a postsynaptic cell and of the gap between the pre- and post-synaptic cells. According to Craver, “what
unifies these items into a component is their organized behavior: the pre-synaptic cell releases
transmitters that traverse the cleft and act on the post-synaptic cell.” (2007, p. 190) Mechanistic
composition, to be spelled out in further detail in the section “Mechanistic compositional organization,”
supplements an explanation of the organization of extended cognitive systems, underpinning the claim
of deeply integrated and hybrid cognitive systems.

4.5. Realization

The relation of realization has played some role in the debate over EC, predominantly in Wilson’s
theory of “wide realization” (1994, 1995, 2004, 2005). According to Wilson, realization is usually
taken to imply that physical realizers are “determinative” of the properties they realize and “physically
constitutive” of the intrinsic states of the individuals with those properties (2001, p. 1). The
determinative part of realization, Wilson calls the metaphysical sufficiency thesis: “Realizers are
metaphysically sufficient for the properties or states that they realize.” (2004, p. 103) The physically
constitutive part of the standard view, Wilson refers to as the physical constitutivity thesis: “Realizers
of states and properties are exhaustively physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the
individual whose states or properties they are.” (2004, p. 104) Central to Wilson’s argument is that the
conjunction of the metaphysical sufficiency thesis and the physical constitutivity thesis is false, since a
“metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive.” (2001, p. 1; italics in
original) As a case in point, consider Rumelhart & McClelland’s (1986) classical example of using pen
and paper to complete a mathematical algorithm. According to Wilson & Clark (2009), what initially
starts as causal interactions between neural representational or informational processes and cultural
representational or informational processes become “incorporated as part of the computational process
itself.” (Wilson & Clark 2009, p. 10) This case shows that on some occasions cognitive properties
“have realizers that extend beyond the individual instantiating them.” (Wilson 2004, p. 107)
Generally there is much to like about the idea of wide realization, since it fits with the ontology of
extended cognitive systems and processes. But, it also seems evident that the project of wide

Please do not cite
realization turns on its empirical substantiation before its metaphysical one. Hence, to avoid begging
the question about where to place the causal-constitutive boundary (Hurley 2010), we can launch a
wide realization argument for EC only after having empirically based the validity of EC. It is this
project that the philosophical account of mechanistic explanation can help with.

5. Second-wave EC and Complementarity

Kirchhoff (2011) has recently shown – in his exploration of a distinctive third-wave version of EC –
that second-wave EC is quite unlike EC based on the PP and extended functionalism. The big question
of this section is: does second-wave EC provide the fodder required to justify its constitution claim?
The argument that I shall pursue is as follows: complementarity alone is insufficient to ground the
constitution claim of EC essentially because complementarity is open to a kind of stalemate scenario
into which the debate over causal relations and constitutive relations has fallen. I am not the only one
skeptical of the complementarity framework. Theiner (2011) has recently argued that second-wave EC
– which he refers to as cognitive integration – does not imply EC unless second-wave EC is augmented
with some version of the PP (see also Rowlands 2010). However, unlike the original formulation of the
PP, which is pitched at the level of resources, Theiner argues that the PP should be applied to the level
of capacities from which one can then individuate entire systems or processes as cognitive. I agree with
this, since my conclusion points in a similar direction, namely that the second-wave EC proponent still
needs an argument for why this particular system as a whole is a system of type Z (where Z =
cognitive). Having discussed the complementarity framework, I shall then explore the main argument
of this paper.

5.1. The Complementarity Argument

Psychologists (Donald 1991) and philosophers of cognitive science (Sutton 2010) inform us that
standard external memory records, or exograms, like those found in Otto’s notebook, are stored in a
discrete fashion (e.g., like the words ‘milk’, ‘meat’, and ‘fruit’ on a grocery list). That is, their
representational schemes are either linguistic or pictorial (or maybe both). They exhibit no dynamics or
activity (for instance, they are not prone to primacy or recency effects). Nor are they intrinsically
integrated with other memory records (e.g., they are not subject to negative transfer effects). Inga’s
biological memory, in contrast, may well blend and interfere (Sutton 2010, p. 197), and is vulnerable to
degradation (Donald 1998, p. 15). Moreover, unlike encodings in exograms, biological memory
exhibits such dynamic features such as informational holism (Clark 1989, p. 107). Additionally, the
representational formats of biological memory are composed and stored in the connection strengths
between the units of neural nets as exemplified in artificial neural networks, which is very different
from symbolic and pictorial representations. In accordance with complementarity, it is precisely this
disparate nature – this deep mechanistic dissimilarity – between neural and extra-neural elements that
explains why agents accomplish cognitive tasks that the ‘naked brain’ alone could not achieve. As
Sutton explains: “Brains like ours need media, objects, and other people to function fully as minds

Please do not cite
[…]: biological traces are typically integrative, active, and reconstructive, but in using them we hook
up with more enduring and transmissible exograms, mostly of our own making, with supplement and
extend our powers.” (2010, p. 205) However, the complementarity framework still faces a worry that
we now ought to expose.
!
5.2. The stalemate problem
!!!

!

Here is the argument in its conceptual form (for a similar argument see Rowlands 2010, pp. 90-91): An
inherent assumption of the C-C fallacy is that even if second-wave EC requires essential differences
between “internal” and “external” processes, this by itself is insufficient to justify the inference that the
latter has cognitive status – the reason being that it remains an open empirical question whether the
“external” parts merely make up an incredibly important array of extra-neuronal scaffolding in which
what constitutes real cognition is internally, neurobiologically generated (Rupert 2010, p. 348). Hence,
even if Otto and his notebook differ importantly in their fine-grained dynamics, it does not follow that
the notebook in virtue of being coupled to or used by Otto-the-agent becomes part of Otto’s cognitive
processing rather than merely augmenting Otto’s capacity to perform a cognitive task, e.g.,
remembering. However, as Theiner mentions, this will not scare the complementarity theorist, since
she/he will typically respond to this charge by “claiming that what makes the external parts of the
transcranial process as cognitive as its internal parts is the fact that they all make some distinctive,
functionally indispensable causal contribution to the exercise of a cognitive capacity.” (2011, p. 56) It
is this move that makes the (potential) stalemate emerge, since now there seems to be no way of
resolving the question whether “external” elements merely causally contribute – perhaps in some deep
way – to cognitive processes and systems or whether these elements in part constitute cognitive
processes and systems. Given that both anti-EC and EC can accommodate the view that there are
uniquely and important differences between “internal” and “external” processes (Adams & Aizawa
2001; Clark 1998; Rupert 2004; Sutton 2006, 2010), why should we prefer a “constitutive” over a
“scaffolding” view of external, cognition-enhancing resources? If this kind of indeterminacy poses a
real problem for second-wave EC, then it would seem that complementarity itself does not suffice in
order to substantiate the constitution claim. This does not entail that the EC theorist should reject a
commitment to complementarity; rather, it indicates that complementarity needs to be supplemented
further. This I take to be the job of Menary’s cognitive integrationist model.

6. Second-wave EC and cognitive integration

Following Menary, I shall argue, firstly, that the focus of cognitive integration on the dimension of
manipulation and cognitive norms establishes one way that EC can ground its ontological claim. In his
Dimensions of Mind, Menary analyzes “epistemic actions” – involving a reciprocal coordination
between the embodied organism and its cognitive niche – so as to support the strong ontological claim
of EC. Epistemic actions are examples of Menary’s “manipulation thesis,” (MT) which he defines as:
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“The manipulation thesis as a constituent thesis of cognitive integration is first understood to be an
embodied engagement with the world, […]. Secondly it is not simply a causal relation, bodily
manipulations are also normative – they are embodied practices developed through habit and training and
governed by cognitive norms.” (Menary 2007, p. 84)

As a constitutive thesis of cognitive integration, the MT establishes just why Menary is not pursuing a
metaphysical conception of constitution but rather an empirically sensitive understanding of the
ontological basis of extended cognitive systems and processes. The MT explains how cognitive
processes and systems are assembled by both habituated bodily patterns of actions, viz., by way of
body schemas (Gallagher 2005), and the cultural practices that govern such actions (Hutchins 2008).
The coordination of brain, body and environmental resources is governed by cultural and social norms
and practices. Hence, the MT begins from the perspective that “we are actively embodied in a socially
constructed cognitive niche […] and this has led to the development of hybrid cognitive systems where
the bodily manipulations of vehicles […] in the niche involves the coordination of neural, bodily, and
environmental vehicles.” (2010c, p. 611) To make this a bit more concrete, let us consider how Menary
defends the MT by reference to Kirsh & Maglio’s (1994; see also Kirsh 1995; 2009) work on epistemic
actions in the case of Tetris.
Epistemic actions are a class of actions, which make mental computation (processing) “easier,
faster, or more reliable.” (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 513) In accordance with the MT, epistemic actions
have this cognitive consequence, because the underlying components of epistemic actions are spread
across neural, bodily, and socio-cultural resources. Instead of relying purely on “internal” processing,
Kirsh & Maglio argue that actively manipulating structures in the environment alters the informational
structure of the immediate environment, thereby reducing the need for too much “internal” processing.
In their study of Tetris, it turns out that expert players, by physically manipulating the falling zoids on
the screen rather than rotating the zoids mentally, can rotate a zoid 90° in only 100 ms, where the
process of mental rotation takes circa 800-1200 ms (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 514). Epistemic actions
thus allow a player (or in the more general case, a cognizer) to reap important time-related benefits. As
Menary argues, the actions that Tetris players perform directly transform the informational structure of
the environment (Menary 2010b, p. 566). On this view, epistemic actions are literally part of the
problem solving process. As Kirsh & Maglio state about their approach – “its chief novelty lies in
allowing individual functional units inside the agent to be in closed-loop interactions with the outside
world.” (1994, p. 542) Or, as Menary claims: “Epistemic actions and computations take place within
the same state space. If this state space is the problem-solving state space, then we have difficulty in
pulling apart mind, action and world […].” (2007, p. 90) One might object that without further
argument the notion of “within the same state-space” is somewhat ambiguous. However, this would be
to misinterpret the explanation given by Menary (2010b). By “state-space” it is clear that Menary
means “information processing space,” which “includes both processes in the head, and processes
outside of the head.” (2010b, p. 567) Hence, the hypothesis of an extended state space entails the
hypothesis of an extended information processing space in which problem solving occurs. Moreover,
and this is an aspect unique to the approach offered by Menary, public vehicles manipulated during
epistemic actions have their own norms “governing how we are to manipulate token representational
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vehicles.” (2010b, p. 570) On Menary’s view, human cognitive capacities are shaped by the normative
and social structure embodied in our recurrent socio-cultural practices, e.g., through participation in the
practice of Tetris playing, the players have developed motor programmes for fast and fluent actions so
as to transform the zoids on the screen. But, “the manipulation of the buttons is itself a normative
practice, something that is learned and habituated.” (2010b, p. 575) Cognitive norms, therefore, are
socio-culturally constructed, and these environmental vehicles take precedence over their sensorimotor
or higher-order instantiations – or are first in “public space” before they become internalized into
“neural space.” What this case study shows is that cognitive integrationism avoids the C-C fallacy,
since the capacity for engaging in epistemic actions are not first “internal” to the organism and then
somehow are extended to include elements in the environment. Rather, epistemic actions are “in the
problem solving state space, not just as a clever strategy for off-loading complexity onto the
environment […], (2010b, p. 568) but as “part of our cognitive economy.” (2010b, p. 568)

7. Mechanistic compositional organization

The second dimension of the ontological claim supplements the MT by explaining the emergence of
cognitive properties from the relation of composition and mechanistic explanation1. In their seminal
paper, Machamer and colleagues give this definition of a mechanism:

“[…] mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes
from start or set-up to finish or termination.” (2000, p. 3)

Mechanisms are typically composed of different kinds of entities (x’s) performing different kinds of
activities (Φ’s), with the x’s and Φ’s organized such that they cooperatively produce a specific kind of
behavior or performance of an overall mechanism (S's Ψ-ing). Generally, if we understand a cognitive
system as a mechanism, extended or non-extended, a cognitive system has properties that are different
from the properties of its individual parts. For instance, a system distributed across brain-body-world
has different properties in regards to either the brain-body system or the brain or body (Hutchins 2011,
p. 425). Complex properties of a mechanism, then, exhibit what Theiner calls a strong form of
1

There is a slight disagreement in the mechanistic literature about the extent to which one can apply the
mechanistic framework to cases of EC. In particular, Craver argues that “many cognitive mechanisms draw upon
resources outside of the brain and outside of the body to such an extent that it is not fruitful to see the skin, or
surface of the CNS, as a useful boundary […].” (2007, p. 141). However, Bechtel (2009) thinks that mechanismstyle explanations are more compatible with weaker embodied and situated approaches to cognition. Note that
Bechtel does not think that this necessarily must be this way. As he mentions (personal communication), what is
critical for a mechanistic explanation is first to identify the phenomenon for which one is seeking an explanation.
If the system accomplishing the phenomenon functions as a result of causal interdependence between an individual
and artifacts, then that is the place to locate the explanation. But, “my bet is that there will remain the task of
explaining how the organism engages their environment, and that this phenomenon is to be explained inside the
head and these will resemble the traditional explanations in cognitive psychology” (personal communication). This
emerging picture between proponents of mechanistic explanation as to whether the framework can be applied to
extended and distributed cognitive science is evidence, it seems to me, of an important fact, namely that the ideas
of EC is being discussed outside the mainstream debates over EC. Moreover, as I have already mentioned, Theiner
(2009) as well as Theiner et al. (2010) apply mechanistic explanation to group cognition, and Theiner (2011)
appeals to the framework of mechanistic explanation to resist the C-C fallacy in the context of his discussion of
extended reasoning.
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organization-dependence (2009, p. 335). Wimsatt (1976, 1986) has argued that one way of determining
the relevancy of the parts in a mechanism with respect to S's Ψ-ing is to contrast aggregative and nonaggregative modes of composition. The key in this distinction is between systems whose parts are
interchangeable (i.e., aggregative) and systems whose parts are not interchangeable (i.e., nonaggregative or mechanistic). Craver (2001), following Wimsatt, defines an aggregate system as follows
(2001, pp. 58-59): “Suppose that a property Ψ of the whole S is a function of the properties {Φ₁, Φ₂, ...,
Φn} of the parts {X₁, X₂, ..., Xn}. Then a Ψ property of S is an aggregate of the Φ properties of Xs
when:

1.

(W1) Ψ is invariant under the rearrangement and intersubstitution of Xs;

2.

(W2) Ψ remains qualitatively similar (if quantitative, differing only in value) with the addition or
subtraction of Xs;

3.

(W3) Ψ remains invariant under the disaggregation and reaggregation of Xs; and

4.

(W4) There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among the Xs that are relevant to Ψ.”

5.
A failure of a system to exhibit aggregativity, then, entails that the properties of the system as a whole
are highly organization-dependent and that it is possible to explain the overall behavior of the system in
terms of its x’s and the interactions of its Φ’s in generating S's Ψ-ing. It follows from Wimsatt’s account
of non-aggregativity that the emergence of higher-level properties in a system is a result of the system’s
compositional organization. First, an extended system is hierarchically organized such that its parts are
organized at multiple different levels – some at the level of the brain, some at the level of the nonneural body, and some at the socio-cultural level. Second, an extended system exhibits a many-to-one
compositional organization, where multiple different parts as well as the interactions among these parts
determine S's Ψ-ing. Third, an extended system (although it also applies to non-extended systems) is
composed of heterogeneous but complementary parts working together in the assembly process of S's
Ψ-ing. Fourth, an extended system (and again not limited to extended systems) is, according to Craver
(2007, pp. 134-139; compare Craver & Bechtel 2007) not only composed of x’s and Φ’s but also
organized from various spatial, temporal and causal conditions and constraints.

7.1. Case study #1: Tetris revisited

In this section, I shall apply the mechanistic framework to the Tetris case in order to supplement the
dimension focusing on bodily manipulations and cognitive norms. I shall argue that we can explain the
emergence of skillful behavior in Tetris

(S’s Ψ-ing) as a result of the enabling system’s organization-

dependent structure violating the criteria of aggregativity (W1-W4). First, in violation of condition
(W4), the x’s and their Φ-ing cooperate in ways deeply relevant to S’s Ψ-ing. Without a particular part
playing its role, the overall performance of S’s Ψ-ing would break down or be incomplete. This holds
regardless of whether there is a malfunction in the parts located at the socio-cultural level or at various
biological levels. Second, this implies that the distributed mechanism underlying skillful performance
in Tetris is organized in a way violating condition (W2): subtracting or even adding component parts

Please do not cite
cannot be achieved without disturbing the mechanisms overall ability to Ψ. Hence, subtracting or
adding parts to the mechanism is likely to result on qualitative dissimilarity with respect to Ψ. Third, in
violation of condition (W1), the parts of the mechanism cannot be rearranged arbitrarily, since what
binds S’s Ψ-ing is the timing of the parts and their interactions (Kirsh 1995, p. 62). The idea of timing
of processing marks an aspect of mechanistically organized systems – temporal organization. As
Craver says:

“The order, rate, and duration of successive component activities are crucial for the [mechanism], [and] it
is not possible to change their order without interfering with how the mechanism works (or making it a
different mechanism entirely).” (2007, p. 138)

In the Tetris study, the physical action of rotating a zoid generates neurobiological processes – Kirsh &
Maglio term these ‘buffer icons’ – which, in turn, are reciprocally interacting with multiple different
functional processes such as motor, attention, generation, and matching processes, while constantly
modulated and constrained by higher-level sociocultural processes (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 542).
Furthermore, mechanisms are also spatially organized. As Craver says: The spatial organization of a
mechanism includes, […], the sizes, shapes, structures, locations, orientations, directions, connections,
and compartments of mechanisms.” (2007, p. 137) The importance of space in cognition has long been
recognized as an essential part of the acquisition of abstract problem-solving abilities (Kirsh 1995), of
developing abstract concepts (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, p. 167), and so on. In Tetris, spatial organization
takes on a similar role, in the sense that the effects of time-efficiency and transformation of
informational structure is due to the location of the zoids, their shapes, and the causal connectivity
established by manipulation. If this is the case then we can understand how extended cognitive systems
include not only neural processes but are compositionally organized so as to include bodily
manipulations of socio-cultural processes as well. This is what supplements Menary’s claim:
“Epistemic actions and computations take place within the same state space. If this state space is the
problem-solving state space, then we have difficulty in pulling apart mind, action and world […].”
(2007, p. 90)

7.2. Case study #2: Emergence of socially distributed remembering

In their study of socially distributed remembering (or collaborative recall), Sutton et al. (2010) argue
that on some occasions, long-term couples have evolved interactive, dynamically integrated systems
for collective memory of past events. Here is one of the dialogues, where a couple is acting in concert
when remembering the beginning of their relationship (2010, p. 551):

Husband: No, I asked her out that night, but she said she couldn’t go.
Wife: No, that’s right.
H: So then I started to pester her the next week.
W: You did, you turned up after my [classes].
H: [Cooking classes].
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W: On Monday night.
H: That’d be it.
W: And took me for coffee.
H: Yes, the next Monday night.
W: And impressed me.
H: Yes.

Drawing on Wegner’s theory of transactive memory (1987), the authors indicate that it is quite likely
that the successful remembering in this long-term couple is an organization-dependent feature of a
“socially coupled dynamical system with emergent properties, which in certain cases can be highly
integrated and enduring and exhibit high levels of continuous reciprocal causation.” (2010, p. 547) It is
of course true, as the authors point out, that not all instances of people remembering together will
involve interactive and dynamical processes, thereby exhibiting aggregative outcomes (2010, p. 552).
But “in other cases each partner offers distinct but complementary contributions to a shared emergent
product.” (Sutton et al. 2010, p. 552) According to Sutton et al. (2010), remembering in this case is not
the operation of the naked brain on its own, with the other person merely an external influence. As
Wegner puts it: “A transactive memory structure thus can be said to reside in the memories of both
individuals – when they are considered as a combined system.” (Wegner 1985, p. 257; quoted in Sutton
et al. 2010, p. 547) Cases of socially distributed cognition are equally taken seriously by Theiner (2009,
2011), Theiner & O’Connor (2010), and Theiner et al., (2010) who argue in favor of a revised version
of the group mind thesis. Influenced by anthropologically sensitive cognitive science (Hollan et al.
2000; Hutchins 1995), the philosophical framework of mechanistic explanation and the transactive
memory approach, Theiner and colleagues argue that recent studies of group cognition – especially
problem solving cases – reveal that cognitive capacities that we normally would not hesitate to ascribe
individual cognizers are also ascribable to groups. What these case studies show, and as the one by
Sutton et al., shows, is how continuous reciprocal causation between people in a group results in
emergent cognitive properties at the group level. The point of contact between my argument in this
paper and the work done by Theiner and colleagues is that we think that extended cognitive systems –
including at the group level – have organization-dependent cognitive capacities. As Theiner et al., says:
“Group cognition is thus emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986).” (2010, p. 378) In their
study of socio-culturally distributed cognition, Theiner and colleagues also report on the phenomenon
of a transactive memory system (TMS). They distinguish between two components of a TMS. First a
representational component, which “consists of the organized stock of memories that are retained by
individual members, including higher-order memories about who knows what.” (2010, p. 388) The
second component is a procedural component, whose function is the continuous creation and constant
maintenance of the representations, including “all direct and indirect communication processes […] by
which individuals cooperatively allocate, encode, retrieve, share, and elaborate memories.” (2010, p.
388) Among the many areas of socially distributed remembering examined by Theiner et al., they look
at how TMS’s have been used in small group research. In these studies, TMS’s are used as latent
group-level variables. According to Theiner et al., TMS’s in small groups working on assembly tasks
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become manifested in several different ways. First as memory differentiation: “i.e. the tendency of
group members to specialize in recalling distinct aspects of the assembly process.” (2010, p. 389) The
second is what they call task credibility: “i.e. how much members trusted one another’s expertise.”
(2010, p. 389) And finally in terms of task coordination: “i.e. the effective use of transactive retrieval
strategies […].” (2010, p. 389) From this, Theiner et al. report several findings. Groups perform much
better when their members undergo training on the task together, and worse if each member of the
group went through the training individually. An important aspect of coordination and collaboration is
that the process of undergoing training together establishes “more elaborate, accurate, and mutually
shared beliefs about the distribution of know-how in groups.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 389)

8. Dissolving the coupling-constitution fallacy

I have already hinted at why Menary’s version of second-wave EC avoids the C-C fallacy. One horn of
the C-C fallacy entails that the EC theorist commits an instance of the fallacy when an environmental
resource deemed cognitive by being causally coupled to an individual cognitive agent. But this is not
what Menary is arguing. As Menary schematizes the idea: “X is the manipulation of the notebook
reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain processes – which together constitute Z, the process of
remembering.” (2006, p. 333). So, the MT as a constitutive thesis does not infer cognitive status to an
environmental resource simply because that resource is causally coupled to a pre-existing cognitive
agent. Menary is clear about this when he says that the goal of cognitive integration is “to explain why
X and Y are so coordinated that they together function as Z, which causes further behavior.” (2006, p.
334) Hence, an extended cognitive property, Z, is an emergent property of a mechanistically composed
system. It is not the case – as exemplified in the Tetris study – that cognition is first “inside” the head
and then “extends outwards”! This claim can be further underpinned by Theiner et al’s use of the
mechanistic framework to support the idea of group cognition or socially distributed cognition. As
Theiner et al., argues:

“To begin with, when we claim that an individual cognitive system X is on some principled way coupled to
another individual cognitive system Y, we do not mean to imply that X is thus part of Y. Instead, what we
assert is rather that the individuals who instantiate X and Y can engage in structured interactions so as to
constitute an organized group-cognitive system Z that encompasses those individuals among its proper
parts.” (2010, p. 390; italics added)

Whereas Menary’s position deals primarily with the “process” version of the C-C fallacy, Theiner et al.
set up an argument against the “systemic” version. The systemic version of the C-C fallacy holds that
even if a cognitive system X is dynamically coupled to a cognitive system Y, it does not entail that X is
part of Y. But this is not what Theiner et al. are arguing. What these authors are stating is that the
persons who “instantiate X and Y can engage in structured interactions so as to constitute an organized
group-cognitive system Z that encompasses those individuals among its proper parts.” (2010, p. 390)
We can follow Theiner et al. (2010), so as to argue that the case studies discussed here compose an
organized cognitive system or process Z that encompasses one or more individuals. The Tetris study
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and the studies on socially distributed remembering “form an integrated system with functional gains.”
(2010, p. 390) Theiner et al., following Wilson (in press), distinguish between three elements of what it
means to be an integrated system with functional gains. First, “two (or more) elements are coupled just
in case they exchange information by means of reliable, two-way causal connections between them
[…],” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 390) so that the elements “are interdependent in their cognitive and
behavioral activities.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 390) In Sutton et al’s study of socially distributed
remembering, successful remembering is an organization-dependent

feature of such continuous

reciprocal causation. Second, “two (or more) coupled elements form an integrated system in situations
in which they operate as a single causal whole […] – with causes affecting the resultant system as a
whole, and the activities of that system as a whole producing certain effects.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p.
390) In both Menary’s redeployment of the Tetris case and in my explanation of the Tetris study by
applying the mechanistic framework, successful performance in Tetris is an emergent property of an
organization-dependent system failing to exhibit aggregativity. Because of this, there is an integrated
system underlying S’s Ψ-ing. Third, “an integratively coupled system shows functional gain just when
it either enhances the existing functions of its coupled elements, or manifests novel functions relative to
those possessed by any of its elements.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 390-91) Both the Tetris case and the
Sutton et al. case of socially distributed remembering satisfy this condition. Also, we see this condition
fulfilled in Theiner et al’s research on small group cognition, since the individual members perform
better when working in joint collaboration rather than working alone.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the proponent of EC is better off explaining the ontological claim of
EC by exploring the coordination dynamics between “internal” and “external” resources rather than
opting for a metaphysical approach to the constitutive claim. In particular, of all the alternative ways of
construing the constitutive claim in the EC literature, I have shown that only Menary’s manipulation
thesis provides an adequate fertile ground for making EC’s ontological claim. In supplementing
Menary’s position, I have argued that the philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanations can shed
additional light on EC’s ontological claim. I have shown this by reference to a few empirical case
studies across the dimensions of “individual-artifact EC” and “collective, socio-culturally distributed
EC.” I hope to have shown that by approaching the constitutive claim from an empirically oriented
perspective, it is possible to resolve the C-C fallacy. I end this paper by briefly positioning my
argument that EC’s constitution claim can be re-evaluated by adopting the relation of composition in
mechanistic explanation within the EC literature. In order to do so, I shall apply Kirchhoff ’s (2011)
taxonomy of first-, second-, and third-wave EC. As we have seen, first-wave EC attempts to ground
constitution

by way of functionalist

parity arguments

and second-wave

EC

in terms

of

complementarity and cognitive integration. Hence, my attempt to justify EC’s ontological foundation
based on the philosophical framework of mechanistic explanation arguably fits better with Kirchhoff ’s
third-wave version of EC.
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